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ABSTRACT 
Climate changes due to emissions of greenhouse gases, (GHGs) is a long-term 
global environmental problem.  Major policy issues relate to the question of the 
appropriate negotiating stance in possible multilateral negotiations for an 
international protocol on GHGS.  This paper discusses a few models designed 
to help policy-makers evaluate the likely economic impacts of various schemes 
for assignments of net emissions quotas. 
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 SOME POLICY ISSUES OF GREENHOUSE GAS ECONOMICS 
 
 Hans W. Gottinger 
 
 
 
1INTRODUCTION 
Despite considerable uncertainty some scientific consensus exists at present 
regarding the environmental consequences of the greenhouse effect.  Briefly, it 
is that large scale, mostly adverse, environmental impacts can be expected to 
occur, in a time-span extending to the next few human generations.  These 
impacts may require costly economic and societal adjustments. 
 The major offset to the generation of carbon dioxide, the most significant 
of the greenhouse gases (GHGs), is forests.  Trees convert atmospheric carbon 
dioxide to biomass and oxygen through photosynthesis, and are thus a crucial 
element in maintaining the composition of the atmosphere.  Further, 
deforestation through burning of forest cover generates significant quantities of 
carbon dioxide, and additional quantities are released from tillage of the soil.  
Loss of forests also increase the albedo (reflective power of the earth) since 
forests are dark and absorb a high proportion of solar radiant energy.  
Deforestation also reduces rainfall, with further potential impacts on 
atmospheric behaviour.  Although forests now cover only 20 percent of the 
earth's land surface, they produce 75 percent by weight of bio-mass.  Since the 
1950s, extensive deforestation of tropical forests has taken place, to the extent 
of 25 - 40 percent of the pristine cover, and continues at an estimated annual 
rate of 80,000 square kilometres - an area the size of Austria. (World 
Resources, 1987).  Current deforestation levels and changing land use 
patterns are estimated to contribute between 10 and 50 percent of the carbon 
dioxide from fossil fuel emissions, (Boyle and Ardill, 1989, p.34).  While large 
scale deforestation in itself has major environmental impacts: reduction in 
fuelwood supplies, loss of genetic resources, soil erosion, silting of reservoirs 
and flooding, its impacts on net GHGs emissions are also very significant.  
Clearly, there are important complementarities between these two sets of 
problems.  One string of present research thus links emissions of greenhouse 
gases with their offset by forests, in both domestic and international regulatory 
approaches.  This is accomplished by allowing domestic industries to purchase 
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offsets from the forest sector to reduce their penalties for emissions, or to 
enable them to use greater quantities of energy.  Economy wide, any excess of 
allowable national emissions over the quantity actually emitted, after allowing 
for offsets generated, is allowed to be traded internationally by the government. 
Since a major source of GHGs is the use of fossil fuels, improved energy 
efficiency and switch to alternative fuels form another important set of related 
issues.  Fossil fuel use is also an important determinant of local and regional 
air quality, through particulate, nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulphur (SOx) 
emissions.  While there are several important complementarities between 
increased energy efficiency, local and regional air quality, and GHGs 
emissions, there are other policy considerations which conflict with these 
objections.  Thus, for example, many countries including several industrialized 
countries (INCs) and newly industrialized economies (NIEs), are dependent on 
imported oil, but have relatively abundant reserves of other energy sources, 
such as coal, hydroelectric potential, and nuclear fuel material.  World oil 
prices in the recent past have fluctuated widely, and adjustments to rapid 
price increases can prove disruptive and costly for national economies.  An 
important policy objective in several countries is reduced dependence on 
imported oil, largely by substitution by domestic energy supplies.  However, 
these alternative fuels may have other, major adverse impacts of their own.  
Substitution of oil by coal often results in increased CO2, NOx, SOx, and 
particulates emissions, while hydroelectricity may displace large populations 
from reservoir sites and may lead, in vulnerable areas, to increased seismic 
risks.  Nuclear energy entails major long-term safety and health hazards, 
through generation of long lived radioactive wastes, potential explosive fissile 
material which may increase the risks of acquisition of `basement' nuclear 
weapons by insurgents, and due to decommissioning of old reactors. 
 The Villach-Bellagio conference, as part of its policy recommendations, 
called for intensification and development of non-fossil fuel energy systems, 
support for reduction in deforestation and increase in forested areas, and 
examination by organizations, of the need for an agreement on a law of the 
atmosphere as a global commons or the need to move towards a convention 
along the lines of that developed for ozone.  A subsequent conference at 
Toronto in June 1988 was more explicit in its policy recommendations.i 
 First the Toronto conference took the unambiguous position that: 
`Humanity is conducting an uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose 
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ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war', and that 
`the best predictions available indicate potentially severe economic and social 
dislocation for present and future generations which will worsen international 
tensions'.  Second, that the industrial countries are the main sources of 
greenhouse gases and therefore bear the main responsibility to the world 
community for ensuring that measures are implemented to address the issues 
posed by climate change.  At the same time, the developing countries must be 
assisted and not inhibited in improving their economies and the living 
conditions of their citizens.  This will necessitate a wide range of measures, 
including significant additional energy use in those countries and 
compensating reductions in industrialized countries.  Further, that while the 
first steps in developing international law and practices to address air pollution 
have already been taken. (Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the 
ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Sir Pollution for Sulphur 
Reductions, 1985.  Part XII of the Law of the Sea Convention, and the Vienna 
Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol, 1987), 
member governments of the UN system and international bodies should 
initiate the development of a comprehensive global convention as a framework 
for protocols on the protection of the atmosphere.  Additionally, the Toronto 
conference concluded, energy policies must be designed to reduce emissions of 
CO2 and other trace gases by more than 50 percent in the long-term, and 
initially, by about 20 percent of 1988 levels by the year 2005. 
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2 LIKELIHOOD OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON GHGS 
What, in fact, is the likelihood that an international protocol for regulating 
GHGs will actually be negotiated and implemented?  In order to answer this, 
one may note the emergence of a framework for analyzing issues relating to 
international regulation of the environment (Hahn and Richards, 1988).  
According to this framework, the probability of reaching an agreement on an 
international environmental issue will increase with greater scientific 
consensus on the cause and seriousness of the problem, increased public 
concern, a perception that negotiating parties are doing their `fair' share to 
mitigate the problem, and an increase in the short-term political benefits from 
reaching an agreement.  The probability of agreements will decrease as the 
costs of control increase and as the number of negotiating parties increases.  
The effect of increased monitoring and enforcement powers is ambiguous. 
 In the case of climate change due to GHGs, scientific consensus largely 
exists regarding the causes, but not on the extent or seriousness of the effects. 
(Lunde, 1991).  Further, actual reductions in GHGs emissions will very likely 
entail major long-term economic costs.  Regarding the benefits of control 
measures, at this point it is not possible to predict their distribution, except 
that they are likely to be very uneven.  This fact will complicate the perceptions 
of `fairness' of control proposals.  Finally, the level of public awareness and 
concern has been increasing in some countries, but is as yet, worldwide, far 
below the level at which significant economic costs would be countenanced, or 
the political benefits of an agreement be attractive.  Hahn and Richards (1988) 
conclude that `the likely response will be a series of informal and formal 
meetings aimed at sharing and disseminating research findings, and giving the 
appearance of making progress on this very difficult issue.  Only when a much 
higher level of scientific consensus emerges will the difficult economic 
sacrifices become tenable.'  Lave (1988) observes that because of the greater 
uncertainties involved in the greenhouse effect, policies should be formulated 
so that they `are unlikely to be harmful or costly if the greenhouse 
consequences are more benign than predicted and likely to help if the worst 
happens'.  Schelling (1988) suggests that substantial near term reductions of 
GHGs emissions are unlikely since countries have already failed to reduce 
consumption of fossil fuels, despite ample motivations for increasing energy 
efficiency.  This discussion, thus, underscores the importance of evaluating the 
long-term economic costs of various alternative policies at the national level to 
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precede serious negotiations for an eventual GHGs treaty.  (Hoel, 1991.) 
 
Several types of policy instruments, operating nationally, as well as 
internationally, have been suggested for tackling the problem of the 
greenhouse effect.  Several of these are intended to work through economic 
incentives, while others rely on directives.  The markets may be global, 
regional, or national, and include trades in permits and offsets.  The directives 
may be at the level of individual states, or at a multilateral level, by agreement 
between sovereign states. 
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3 TYPES OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Some of the policy instruments which have been discussed in the literature are 
examined here.  The first set of policies are intended to work at the national 
level, and the second, internationally. 
 
3.1 National Level Policies 
It is widely recognized that inefficient energy use results largely from 
widespread subsidies on energy use in many countries, and additionally, from 
the failure of markets to reflect the full social costs of energy use, including 
environmental externalities.  Low energy prices encourage substitution of 
energy for other scarce factors, chiefly capital or labour, or both.  
Consequently, there are increased emissions of GHGs and other pollutants.  
Also, if imported oil is cheap relative to domestic energy sources, this price 
differential encourages dependence on imported oil.  Further, the use of 
renewable energy sources, for example, solar or wind energy devices, which in 
general are non-polluting, is also discouraged by low relative prices for fossil or 
nuclear fuels.  Thus policies such as indirect taxation of energy sources, and 
energy intensive commodities (such as steel, aluminum, or transportation), 
tariffs and quantity restrictions on oil and other imports, and various 
abatement strategies for emissions of GHGs and other pollutants, can, over a 
period of time for adjustment, have profound impacts on energy use 
efficiencies, patterns of use of different energy types, and the environment. 
 National level policies include fiscal incentives for greater energy use 
efficiency in the economy as a whole including the transportation, industrial 
and utility sectors.  Market incentives for creation of offsets, including 
tradeable offsets of new sources of GHGs such as forest plantations, constitute 
another set.  A third set are industry or economy wide emissions standards, 
maintained by flat or by marketable permits, possibly including trading 
permits with offsets. 
 The category of fiscal incentives for greater energy efficiency would, 
typically, include indirect taxation of energy sources, as well as taxation of 
inefficient use of energy in the transportation sector, while subsidizing more 
(technically) efficient energy use, for example, public transportation.  Similarly, 
shifts to alternative technically feasible fuel types, which generate lower 
quantities of GHGs or other pollutants, such as renewable energy sources, 
may be motivated by differential taxes, such as a `GHGs tax'ii, or subsidies on 
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different fuel types.  Other fiscal strategies, for example indirect taxation of 
energy intensive sectors, such as steel or aluminium manufacture, may have 
the effect of significantly reducing overall energy consumption.  In the 
economy, and perhaps on energy use efficiency and pollution generated, by 
motivating such industries to reduce energy use by substituting other inputs 
for energy.  Such instruments may also be selectively applied on sectors, in 
which substitution possibilities are the highest.  Alternatively, such taxation 
may result in increases relative prices for these commodities, which in turn 
may result in reduced demand and output, and shift in investment to less 
energy intensive industries, with a consequent fall in energy use. 
 Offsets for emissions of GHGs are intended to furnish compensatory 
capacity to the ecosystem for removal of GHGs from the ecosystem.  
Importantly, these would include forest plantations, with the safeguard that 
the bio-mass generated would not be used as fuel.  While forests remove only 
carbon dioxide, to the proportional extent that other GHGs are fungible with 
CO2 in their greenhouse impact, their emissions too may be compensated for 
by forest plantations.  Further, industries generating GHGs, and under 
obligation to compensate such emissions, may do so by renting offset capacity 
in national or international markets from other agents.  The income 
redistribute effects of such offset schemes, between the factors in which GHGs 
generating sectors are intensive, typically capital, and those in which the offset 
sector is intensive, land and rural labour, are important from the policy 
standpoint. 
 Direct regulatory devices for environmental regulation have traditionally 
included emissions standards, as well as pollution taxes (or fees), and 
subsidies for reducing pollution.  The standard results relied upon for 
operating these policy instruments have evolved mostly through partial 
equilibrium (PE) analyses, since theoretical general equilibrium (GE) analyses 
in this field have been emerging more recently (Boero et al., 1991).  These 
results assume that effective enforcement is possible and costless.  On the 
other hand, it is well understood by economists that `almost anything can 
happen in a general equilibrium model, under particular assumptions about 
factor proportions and elasticities' (Hartwick and Olewiler, (1986, p 414).  It 
would accordingly be inadvisable to assume that the results presented below 
apply unchanged in the GE situation as well: 
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1.A government trying to achieve an optimal amount of pollution through the 
use of taxes or fees that reflect individuals willingness to pay for 
pollution reduction will have difficulty determining the optimal tax.  This 
is because of the `free-rider' problem: when the tax or fee is an 
increasing function of the individuals stated willingness to pay, it is a 
dominant strategy for individuals to always under-report willingness to 
pay for pollution reduction, and the level of pollution resulting from the 
use of taxes or fees determined on the basis of such revelations will be 
more than is optimal.iii 
 
2.In a consumption externality such as that involving air-pollution, property 
rights and the initial position for bargaining over emissions levels will 
affect the final equilibrium.  The amount of air-pollution that exists after 
the externality is internalized is typically higher if initially the air is 
polluted and polluters have the right to use the air as a waste 
depository, than if clean air is the starting point and pollution is not 
permitted initially. 
 
3.The imposition of a tax on pollution can internalize an externality, and 
achieve allocative efficiency.  However, if real incomes are to be 
maintained at pre-tax levels, those facing the tax must be subsidized.  
When the marginal costs of abatement of pollution differ among firms, a 
tax minimizes the total costs of abatement for any given environmental 
quality standard.iv 
 
4.Emissions standards (quantity restrictions) on pollution can also internalize 
the externality, but typically entail higher enforcement costs than an 
optimal tax.  When the marginal costs of abating pollution differ among 
firms, a standard will entail higher costs of abatement than a tax which 
accomplishes the same level of environmental quality. 
 
5.A production externality that leads to pollution is internalized where the 
marginal benefits from pollution equal the marginal damages from 
pollution.  The optimal amount of pollution is generally not equal to 
zero.  If the externality is private, merger and bargaining can internalize 
it.  If the externality is public, taxes and/or standards are required. 
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6.A subsidy to firms to reduce pollution, will in the long-run, lead to increased 
entry into the polluting industry, and lead to increase in pollution over 
time.  An equivalent tax will lead to exit from the industry, and reduce 
aggregate pollution. 
 
7.When the government does not know the location of the marginal benefit or 
damage curves for pollution, but has information on their slopes, it 
should use a pollution standard if the marginal benefit curve is flatter 
(in absolute value) than the marginal damage curve, and a tax if the 
reverse is true.  This will minimize the expected efficiency losses from 
adopting a non-optimal policy. 
 
 In addition to the policy instruments discussed above, tradeable 
permitsv have been proposed by economists as a means of achieving aggregate 
pollution standards at potentially lower cost than standards imposed on each 
polluter.  Some proposed systems are; 
 
1.The Ambient Based System (ABS) which requires polluters to hold permits 
for all regions into which their emissions flow.  The government 
determines the aggregate number of permits consistent with the ambient 
air quality for each region, assigns or auctions the permits to polluters, 
and allows them to trade.  The market price of the permits is then the 
marginal abatement cost for the marginal firm in each region. 
 
2.The Emissions Based System (EBS), defines the number of permits for a 
given region consistent with a desired regional standard, without 
reference to any local variation within the region (`hot spots').  Polluters 
can trade only within the region and all emissions within a given 
regional are treated as equivalent. 
 
3.The Offset System, relies on tradeable permits defined in terms of emissions 
within the region, as long as air quality is maintained at all receptor 
points.vi  One market operates for each region (like the EBS).  Cost 
minimization trade would result given a sufficient number of 
participants.vii 
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 While emissions standards are essentially command instruments, 
pollution taxes, emissions trading and tradeable permits are incentive based.  
Additionally, tradeable permits also eliminate uncertainty about aggregate 
economy wide emissions levels, and in the case of auctioned permits, the need 
to determine initial emissions endowments, assuming that the policy is 
effectively administered.  However, emissions standards may be 
administratively simpler to operate, particularly if enforced through technology 
approvals.viii 
 
 All of these policy devices may be employed by national governments for 
regulating GHGs emissions.  Some considerations which are specific to the 
case of GHGs regulation, both national and multilateral, and which should be 
kept in mind while considering the application of these instruments, are as 
follows: 
 
1.While the damage from climate change may be uneven between global 
regions, the emissions from all points on the globe are equivalent in 
their damage potential wherever they may occur (Gottinger and Barnes, 
1993).  This is because GHGs are rapidly dispensed in the atmosphere, 
while their impacts on global climate may take decades to manifest.  
This means that it is only necessary to ensure that global limits on net 
emissions of GHGs are maintained, and actual net emissions from 
different countries or regions may vary.  Thus, trading in emissions 
rights may be organized at different levels: national, regional, and global, 
without regard to local variations in climatic impacts. 
 
2.For any given country, the marginal damage curve is highly uncertain at the 
present state of knowledge regarding the impacts of global climate 
change.  Almost any assumption regarding the slope of the marginal 
damage curve for a particular country: flat, downward sloping, or 
upward sloping may be argued without categorical refutation.  It is even 
possible that some countries may experience zero or negative marginal 
damage curves.  Further while the marginal benefits curves are 
plausibly always in the positive region, their slope too are highly 
uncertain in most cases.  Devising optimal policies, for example, levels of 
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standards or taxes, depend on knowledge of these curves.  An illustrator 
is furnished for the cases of standards and taxes in Figures 1 and 2.  
First best policies for GHGs regulation from the efficiency standpoint 
cannot therefore be identified in general, at the level of individual 
countries. 
 
Figure 1:Efficiency Losses due to Uncertainty in Marginal Benefit Curve 
(Graphical PE Analysis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t:   Pollution tax, Z: standard 
MB:  True marginal benefit curve 
MB': Mistaken marginal benefit curve 
MD:  Marginal damage curve 
 
Area abc:  Efficiency loss due to standards 
Area bed:  Efficiency loss due to pollution tax 
 
 
 
Figure 2:Efficiency Losses due to Uncertainty in Marginal Damage Curve 
(Graphical PE Analysis) 
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t:   Pollution tax, Z': standard 
MD:  True marginal damage curve 
MD': Mistaken marginal damage curve 
 
Area abc: Efficiency loss when either standards or pollution taxes are used. 
 
3.Since the major source of GHGs emissions is energy use by industries, and 
almost all industries employ significant energy inputs, the use of GHGs 
regulatory (and fiscal policy) instruments will significantly affect energy 
use patterns.  Second order effects will be pervasive, and cannot be 
captured by PE analyses, on the results of which policy 
recommendations are typically based.  Since few theoretical GE analyses 
have been attempted, policies may be based on empirical GE 
approaches.  This is true at both national and multilateral levels. 
 
 The present modelling exercise allows, at the national level, for 
emissions standards, tradeable permits (both assigned and auctioned), taxes, 
and trading in offsets.  The question of which particular instruments will be 
chosen may reflect the historical experience, administrative structure, and 
political culture of each country. 
 Perceptions of how well the instruments are believed to work, can matter 
a great deal for instrument choice, for example, in the adoption of market-
based incentives (Heister et al., 1992).  Additionally, information transmission 
across countries is also important in explaining what problems get regulated, 
and the type of regulations adopted.  While there is wide agreement among 
economists that the presumption of government policies being economically 
efficient are unwarranted, little is known about the extent of deviation from 
economic efficiency that results from government policies.  
 
3.2 Multilateral Policy Instruments 
A long-term solution to the global problem of GHGs emissions will require a 
multilateral agreement on overall net emissions criteria for apportionment of 
emissions rights between countries and verification provisions.  While one can 
state with certainty that such an agreement must provide for independent 
national procedures for compliance, little else can be stated with confidence in 
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present regarding other possible terms. 
 The action of tradeable permits by some internationally authorized body 
to sovereign states is probably infeasible in the multilateral context.  This is 
because INCs with greater resources will be perceived to have the ability to 
form buyer cartels at such auctions, to the detriment of developing countries 
(DCs) which have fewer resources, and are more numerous and heterogenous. 
 Even if such a market were competitive, equity considerations would preclude 
assigning emissions rights to countries on the basis of existing national 
incomes (or national stock of marketable goods and services).  Further, the 
disbursement of revenues collected through such auctions would involve major 
international political problems. 
 The Montreal Protocol (1988) on potential ozone depletion (POD) 
emissions is the sole precedent of an international agreement on a long-term, 
global atmospheric pollution problem.  The international regulatory system 
included in the present model, is derived from certain features of the Montreal 
Protocol on which no serious objections have yet been expressed, even though 
the Protocol as a whole has not been accepted by a majority of states in the UN 
system. 
 The original signatories to the Protocol numbered 25 States, including 
the US, the former USSR and the European Economic Community members.  
No major developing country, including China and India, acceded.  At a 
conference in London in March 1989, these two countries spelled out their 
objections to the original Protocol.  China objected to asymmetrical treatment 
of industrialized and developing countries on the question of quota 
assignments stating that the document did not fully reflect the fair rule of `the 
greater the emission, the greater the reduction'.  In particular the base levels 
for determining future consumption and production were centered on the 
existing low levels and therefore perceived as inequitable to DCs.  India's 
objections to the Protocol also centered on unequal assignments of 
consumption quotas between industrialized and developing countries.  It was 
pointed out that, in practical terms because of the existing extremely low 
present levels of consumption of the controlled substances in the DCs even the 
upper limit of 0.3 kg per capita per year during 1995-97 was irrelevant.  The 
Protocol would have the long term result of allowing consumption levels  of 
only 0.005 kg per capita per year for developing countries, compared to 100 
times that level per capita year for INCs.  Further, India felt that the provisions 
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for assistance to developing countries to enable them to switch to 
environmental benign technologies were vague, and that such assistance 
should be reflected in the Protocol as a manifestation of a mandatory `polluter 
pays' principle. 
 To date 53 countries (out of 166 in the UN system) have committed 
themselves to acceding to the Protocol.  The majority of those who have not 
acceded are developing countries.  Clearly, the objections to the Protocol 
articulated by China and India are shared by many DCs.  However, one may 
identify aspects of the Protocol about which no serious reservations have been 
expressed, and regarding which it may be assumed that there is international 
consensus.  The international regulatory system for GHGs postulated in the 
model here is fashioned after these aspects. 
 First, the idea of international regulation of ozone depletors as a global 
environmental problem, including verification and penalty provisions, has not 
been objected to by any sovereign State.  By analogy, it is postulated that the 
idea of some international regulatory regime for GHGs is acceptable to the 
international community.  Further, as stated above, the Villach-Bellagio and 
Toronto conferences called for examination of a global convention as a 
framework for specific Protocols for atmospheric pollution.  Second, the 
concept of mandatory national (production and consumption) quotas for PODs 
within such a Protocol, as distinct from the question of the basis for allotment 
of such quotas, has not been objected to by potential signatory States.  Third, 
no objections have been voiced on the concept of trading in (production) 
quotas for PODs by signatories, and of fungibility between different controlled 
substances within overall environmental damage limitations (in production 
and consumption) allowed to each State. 
 The international regulatory regime postulated in the present model 
derives from these generally acceptable features of the Montreal Protocol.  In 
brief, it includes net national emissions quotas for GHGs (with fungibility 
between different GHGs and offsets based on their greenhouse potential) and 
trading in net national emissions quotas.  The economic effects of actual level 
of net national emissions quotas and financial flows between signatory States 
linked to past emissions (an application of the `polluter pays' principle), which 
are two controversial aspects of the Montreal Protocol, may be explored 
through simulations of the model. 
 The multilateral instruments which are particularly important in the 
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GHGs context, are international trading in national GHGs quotas and offsets 
and financial flows linked to past emissions.  Trading in GHGs entitlements 
and offsets may permit the achievement of agreed standards at lower overall 
resource cost than non-transferable net emissions quota assignments.  Net 
national emissions quotas, being tradeable, and financial flows would 
represent real resource endowments, and countries may be expected to agitate 
strongly by allotment schemes that would ensure for them the largest share of 
such endowments.  An important objective of the present modelling effort, is 
thus, to fashion a policy analysis tool that would help countries develop their 
negotiating positions over national emissions quotas, and financial flows 
linked to past emissions, in the light of their perceived national interests.  In 
case `free-riding' would not be a problem such interests point toward joint 
implementation schemes.  (Hanisch et al., 1993).  Other objectives include 
evaluation of the impacts on the national economy of different domestic policy 
instruments for reduction in GHGs emissions. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
Climate change due to emissions of greenhouse gases is a long-term, global 
environmental problem.  While specific impacts on different regions as well as 
their timing, are yet uncertain.  It is reasonable to suppose that unilateral 
voluntary action by individual countries to reduce their net emissions of GHGs 
is unlikely.  This is because significant reduction of net GHGs emissions by a 
single major net omitter, say for example the US is unlikely to substantially 
slow down their rate of increase in concentration in the atmosphereix because 
the emissions of GHGs worldwide is increasing rapidly with spreading 
industrialization.  On the other hand, unilateral changes in energy use 
patterns are widely perceived to have adverse effects on a country's economic 
growth consumer welfare, and trade competitiveness.  This perception is 
shared by both developing (DCs) and industrialized countries (INCs). 
 It is likely therefore, that if the scientific evidence for major adverse 
environmental impact of global net emissions of GHGs becomes strong, 
negotiations for an eventual international treaty to limit or reduce net GHGs 
emissions would gain momentum.  Countries would be hardly likely, however, 
to relinquish their independence in the matter of domestic control over policies 
for compliance with the negotiated terms of such a protocol, in favour of a 
supranational regulatory body.  This would be due to considerations of 
preserving national sovereignty, as well as the belief that the choice of 
domestic policies for national compliance with such a multilateral scheme may 
have important growth, welfare distributive, and trade impacts.  The question 
of instrument choice for regulation of net GHGs emissions at the national level, 
is therefore important from the policy perspective. 
 Significant changes in net GHGs emissions in any country will have to 
focus on energy use patterns, as well as on afforestation.  This is because the 
most important of GHGs which result from anthropogenic activities, CO2 and 
another GHG, N2O, largely result from fossil fuel use.  Further, the major offset 
to GHGs (since on the issue of climate change, different GHGs are fungible in 
their damage potential) is forests which sequester carbon from CO2.  Thus 
regulation of net GHGs emissions is also related to the use of land, an 
important natural resource and primary factor input. 
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Footnotes 
 
 
i.  Source:  Statement issued by the participants at the World Conference on 
`The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security', June 1988, 
reproduced in Boyle and Ardill, (1989), pp. 247-257. 
ii.  A GHGs tax is a tax on net emissions of CO2 or other GHGs in terms of 
their damage potential. 
iii. A theoretical solution to the free-rider problem has been proposed by 
Groves and Ledyard (1977).  This approach presents a general equilibrium 
model in which private commodities are allocated through competitive markets 
and public goods by government allocation and taxation rules that depend on 
information communicated to the government by consumers regarding their 
preferences.  A wide range of strategic behaviour, including the possibility of 
understatement of preferences or free-riding, is allowed for consumers in their 
communication with the government.  The paper formulates a particular 
government allocation-taxation scheme for which the behavioral equilibria are 
Pareto optimal: given the government rules, consumers find it in their self-
interest to reveal their true preferences for public goods.  No real world scheme 
has yet evolved or been proposed as a practical manifestation of these results 
since budget balance for the government cannot be guaranteed under their 
proposed mechanism, and indeed, the authors acknowledge that it is 
impractical to directly implement their proposed scheme. 
iv.  The government does not need to know the costs of abatement, nor does 
the tax have to be optimally chosen.  Formally, the planner's problem is to 
minimize the sum of expenditures over all firms on two kinds of inputs: those 
used to control pollution, and those used to produce conventional goods, 
subject to restrictions on pollution, production, and on the relationship 
between pollution and production. 
v.  Each permit applies to a `single' pollutant defined in terms of the type of 
environmental damage caused.  Thus, in the case of GHGs, permits may be 
designed for emissions of CO2 and N2O together each weighted by its 
greenhouse effect potential. 
vi.  Receptor points are locations where air or water quality is measured, and 
where it is desired by policy to maintain environmental quality. 
vii.  The model described below, allows for tradeable permits, analogous to 
EBS, for both domestic and international regulation of GHGs. 
viii.  Some experience in the operation of emissions trading between firms, 
perhaps a precursor of tradeable permits, has been gained in the US since 
1976.  One assessment is that the scheme has saved more than $4 billion in 
control costs, with no adverse impact on air quality (Hahn and Hester, 1987). 
  
  
 
  
ix.  The US in the eighties contributed one quarter of world wide emissions of 
CO2, the most important of GHGs (Gottinger and Barnes, 1993). 
